Attorney General of India Political executive
Unlike a public prosecutor in the UK model, India's AG is not full-time and is constitutionally permitted to maintain a private legal practice alongside advising the government -- a dual role critics argue blurs independence -- and the office holds no fixed term, serving entirely at the President's (in practice, the government's) pleasure.
Read the full file Bureaucratic executive
Not a constitutional office (created by rules of business, not the Constitution itself) but functions as the top administrative link between the political executive and the permanent bureaucracy; influence depends heavily on personal rapport with the PM's office rather than any codified independent power.
Read the full file Political executive
Like the PM at the Union level, a Chief Minister's actual power depends heavily on assembly majority size and coalition arithmetic rather than the office's formal text; a CM leading a single-party majority behaves very differently from one holding together a fragile multi-party coalition.
Read the full file Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Constitutional body
CAG reports have exposed major instances of financial irregularity (e.g. 2G spectrum, coal block allocations) and receive heavy media attention, but the office has no enforcement power of its own -- impact depends entirely on whether the Public Accounts Committee and executive act on its findings.
Read the full file Bureaucratic executive
Despite near-zero constitutional visibility, the Collector is often the most powerful and most encountered face of the state for ordinary citizens -- controlling law-and-order coordination, land records, disaster response, and election administration as the District Election Officer, making this one of the starkest dejure/defacto gaps in the entire system.
Read the full file Election Commission of India Constitutional body
Generally credited with successfully administering the world's largest elections, but has faced recurring criticism over the model code of conduct's inconsistent enforcement, EVM-related public trust debates, and the executive-dominated appointment process for Election Commissioners.
Read the full file Constitutional body
Recommendations are not legally binding on Parliament, but by strong convention have been accepted in full or near-full by every Union government to date; the devolution formula is nonetheless a recurring flashpoint, especially southern states' objection to population-based weightage criteria that they argue penalizes decades of successful family-planning outcomes.
Read the full file Political executive
Discretionary powers (reserving bills for the President, timing of assent, inviting a CM after a hung result) are frequently exercised in ways that track alignment with the Union government rather than neutral constitutional judgment, a recurring source of Centre-State friction and litigation.
Read the full file Constitutional body
The Supreme Court held in Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022) that GST Council recommendations are advisory, not binding, on Parliament or state legislatures -- yet in practice no state has gone its own way on a Council decision to date, and the design leaves no state an individual veto, meaning a proposal only fails if 11 or more state finance ministers oppose it together.
Read the full file Judiciary
Chronic case backlog undercuts the theoretical reach of that broad writ jurisdiction: High Courts alone account for tens of millions of pending cases nationally, and, like the Supreme Court, judge appointments and transfers run through an opaque collegium process that has drawn sustained criticism for its lack of published criteria.
Read the full file Leader of the Opposition (Lok Sabha) Legislature
A widely repeated "10% rule" -- that a party needs at least a tenth of the House's seats to claim the post -- has no basis in the actual statute, yet Speakers invoked it to deny the Congress party the post for a full decade across the 16th and 17th Lok Sabhas (2014-2024) despite it being the largest opposition party both times, until it cleared the informal threshold in 2024.
Read the full file Quasi-judicial
The Act passed in 2013 but the first Lokpal wasn't appointed until 2019 -- delayed partly by disputes over the selection committee's composition in the absence of a recognised Leader of Opposition; as of early 2025 it had ordered preliminary inquiries in only 24 cases over five years and secured prosecution sanctions in just 6, with no completed prosecutions, feeding its widely used "toothless tiger" label.
Read the full file